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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of capital access for minority media firms is a familiar
problem. Minority representation is low in many media organizations, and
minority representation among management and capital interests is virtu-
ally nonexistent. At this moment, there is only one publicly traded minor-
ity media organization, Granite Broadcasting, in which a large institutional
investor would be able to invest.'
* Lloyd Kurtz is a research analyst with Harris Bretall Sullivan & Smith, a San Fran-
cisco money management firm. Prior to joining Harris Bretall, he was senior research ana-
lyst at Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., a social investment research firm. His articles on
socially responsible investing have appeared in The Journal of Investing, The Journal of
Performance Measurement, and The Social Investment Almanac.
1. Telephone Interview with Steven Lydenberg, Research Director, Kinder, Lyden-
berg, Domini & Co. (June 1998).
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Recognizing that the current level of investment in minority media by
pensions and mutual funds is small, this Article examines the situation by
discussing, in turn, the nature of institutional investors, the structure of so-
cially responsible investing, and the possible role that the largest media
companies might play in a solution.
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
The primary challenge facing minority executives seeking institu-
tional capital is the nature of institutional investors themselves. Consider-
able research has been done in recent years on the preferences and behav-
ior of this peculiar species (of which the Author is an example).
A. Benchmark Driven
Institutional investors usually measure performance relative to some
benchmark. A portfolio return of 20 percent may appear acceptable, but
most institutions would be disappointed if the passively managed alterna-
tive-an index fund-earned 25 percent during the same period. This in-
troduces subtle but powerful biases into the institution's decision-making
process, and these biases create significant obstacles for small firms mak-
ing capital. As anyone who is measured against a benchmark knows, the
first step in beating it is to buy a portfolio that closely resembles it, over-
weighting those names that offer superior return potential, and under-
weighting those with poorer prospects. This means that the vast majority
of the portfolio will be invested in the largest names in the benchmark. If
the capital-seeking firm is not in the benchmark, it may be entirely ex-
cluded from consideration.
B. Loss Aversion
Institutional investors are loss averse. Numerous studies have shown
that, over the long term, investors consistently prefer to avoid losses at the
expense of long-term gains.2 This "myopic loss aversion"' may be attrib-
uted to the short time horizons over which managers are evaluated. In a
typical firm, portfolio managers review performance with their clients at
least annually, and often on a quarterly basis. These meetings require that
the manager explain why this or that stock has performed poorly, even
when the overall portfolio performance has been good. This fact of life
2. See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity
Premium Puzzle, 110 Q. J. ECON. 73 (1995).
3. Id.
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deters managers from exploring stocks that appear to have significant
short-term risk, no matter how promising their long-term prospects.
The fact that institutional investors often use a group decision-
making process may also contribute to loss aversion. Although group deci-
sion making offers clear advantages-notably the ability to involve the
best-informed people in the decision-making process-it also leads to
more conservative decisions.
William O'Barr and John Conley report that the institutional inves-
tors they interviewed focused less than expected on cold, rational analysis
of risk and return. Instead, their processes appeared to be designed to dif-
• 4
fuse responsibility for decision making and enhance group cohesiveness.
They also found that analysts tend to be reluctant to recommend a stock
unless they have a high degree of personal confidence in management.
5
C. Superficiality
Even the most sophisticated institutional investors are, according to
the late Phil Carret, professionally superficial. This does not result from a
lack of competence, but from the constraints under which they operate.
Most institutions deal with a very large number of securities; Harris Bretall
Sullivan & Smith, a specialist in the large-cap growth style, has a universe
of over 250 names. Even in the largest and most prosperous firms, no deci-
sion maker has sufficient resources to know every relevant fact of every
investable company. Combine this with the mathematical complexities of
portfolio management, and it is not hard to see why so few investors have
a truly deep understanding of securities in which they invest.
All these factors tend to work against minority media organizations.
These firms are usually small and not in any benchmark. Investment op-
portunities are usually at above-average levels of risk (although rewards
are likely commensurate). They may require that managers expend greater
than normal effort to understand them. And finally, precisely because of
their minority status, these firms' managers are less likely, at least at first,
than many others to be regarded as a "safe bet."
One may read the foregoing as a dismal assessment of the prospects
for institutional investment in minority media, but these characteristics
also imply opportunity. Institutional behavior is nothing if not predictable,
and some companies become institutional favorites because they appeal to
4. William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Managing Relationships: The Culture of
Institutional Investing, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept-Oct. 1992, at 21.
5. Id.
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institutional preferences. As an analyst, it appears that popular growth
stocks have some or all of the following features:
Easy-to-Understand: Peter Lynch has argued that if the story cannot
be expressed in a single sentence, it probably is not much of a thesis.6 The
following sentence is a suggestion for minority media organizations: Mi-
nority media organizations will generate superior returns for investors by
reaching large, rapidly growing, and previously untapped markets. The
demographic changes in this country ensure that there is, in fact, a simple
and powerful story to tell.
Great Track Record: Though all deny it, most investors tend to ex-
trapolate past trends into the future. George Orwell called it a "major
mental disease, 7 but if so, it is virtually universal and probably incurable.
This represents a major challenge for minority media organizations, which
are, for the most part, unseasoned.
Good Economics: Warren Buffett defines good economics as having
a strong competitive position and the ability to generate significant free
cash flows relative to investment. Many media organizations are attractive
by this standard. Warren Buffett himself has cited radio stations as an ex-
ample of good economics, particularly in an inflationary environment. By
definition, minority media organizations have strength in an important
niche market, and this is an important barrier to entry.
Sell-Side Support: Investment banking firms employ large institu-
tional sales forces that maintain contact with institutional investors. These
sales forces can raise the visibility of an unknown company and articulate
a complex strategy to time-constrained investors. In general, sell-side sup-
port is strongest for firms with which the banker does investment banking
business. The strongest banking relationships are those in which the com-
pany makes many acquisitions. For this reason, a consolidator could play a
positive role in attracting capital to minority media.
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI): Finally, there is the emerging
field of SRI. One would expect social investors to be an ideal source of
capital for minority media. Unfortunately, this does not appear to be the
case, for reasons that will be discussed in the next Part.
D. Socially Responsible Investing
The field of socially responsible investing has enjoyed a renaissance
in the 1990s, despite the loss of focus and assets caused by the end of the
6. PETER LYNCH & JOHN ROTHCHILD, BEATING THE STREET 27 (1993) ("Never invest
in any idea you can't illustrate with a crayon.").
7. GEORGE ORWELL, Second Thoughts on James Burnham, in THE ORWELL READER
347 (1956).
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South Africa boycott. The Social Investment Forum reports that approxi-
mately $529 billion are now invested under some type of social screening.8
Practitioners have been emboldened by strong recent performance: the
Domini Social Index (DSI), an index of 400 stocks passing typical social
screens, has outperformed the Standard and Poor's 500 since its inception
in May 1990, and virtually erased memories of the underperformance of
South Africa-free portfolios in the late 1980s.
Socially responsible investing has many definitions. There are as
many approaches to SRI as there are value systems, and practitioners in-
clude not only political progressives and church groups (the DSI constitu-
ency), but also Catholic organizations, labor unions, and the not-for-profit
sector. The value systems may be diverse, but the practice of social in-
vestment generally follows one of two patterns-portfolio screening or
targeted investment. Unfortunately, neither is currently well suited to mi-
nority media.
Portfolio screening is by far the most prevalent approach, accounting
for well over 90 percent of socially responsible assets in this country.
Screening involves identifying companies whose behavior is at odds with
the investor's values and excluding them from the portfolio. The process is
fundamentally exclusionary, and, in spite of the efforts of industry leaders,
little progress has been made in the implementation of "positive screens."
One apparently ideal solution has not worked out: Two mutual funds fo-
cusing on diversity issues, the Women's Equity Fund and the Meyers Pride
Value Fund, have had difficulty raising assets. Portfolio screeners are
subject to all the constraints and shortcomings noted in the discussion of
institutional investors. As a result, minority media organizations ought not
to expect much of them.
The second SRI approach, targeted investing, may hold greater
promise for minority media, particularly for small local firms. Also known
as "community investing" or "high-impact investing," this method seeks
out opportunities where relatively small capital investment can generate
substantial social returns. Unlike portfolio screening, there is usually no
demand that returns match or beat a specific benchmark.
Targeted investing generally commits small sums, usually via debt
instruments, and is often combined with grants. Examples of recipients in-
clude affordable housing projects, day care centers, organic farms, and,
8. Social Investment Forum, 1997 Trends Report on Responsible Investing Trends in
the United States, November 5, 1997 (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.socialinvest.org/
Areas/Research/trends/1997-Trends.htm>.
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most promisingly, small urban business. At least one new venture capital
group has been formed with a view toward funding minority businesses.
Minority media could clearly benefit from this growing pool of capi-
tal, but there are constraints. Minority ownership alone is unlikely to con-
vince targeted investors to commit funds. The capital seeker must also
demonstrate some social benefit. It should be recognized that targeted in-
vestors have little experience investing in media companies, which raises
their perceived risk level.
Portfolio Screening Targeted Investing
Motivation Avoid "Bads" Positive Change
Usual Structure Screened Equities Micro-Loans
Typical Practitioner Church/Individual Foundation
Expected Returns In-Line with Market Below-Market
Assets Deployed = $530 billion = $4 billion
I. THE ENTERTAINMENT CONGLOMERATES
Although somewhat beyond the formal scope of this discussion, it is
worthwhile to consider the possibility of seeking capital from large estab-
lished media companies. These companies have traditionally been an im-
portant source of funding in the media industry and appear to have a good
diversity record.
The idea that Time-Warner, Disney, or Viacom might be considered
above average in their handling of diversity issues may seem counterintui-
tive to some. Leading social research organizations do tend to give them
high marks, however, not just on diversity, but also on other issues. This is
a good illustration of how social research is practiced today, and it illus-
trates both the strengths and weaknesses of current methods.
The 1990s saw a dramatic change in the practice of social research.
Professional social researchers such as Steven Lydenberg of KLD, John
Lickerman of Calvert Group, Ben Courson of Citizens Trust, and Steve
Dyott of the Council on Economic Priorities began to perfect techniques
that enabled them to analyze much larger groups of companies than had
9. See Exhibit 1.
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been previously possible. Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., for example,
now writes reports on over 700 U.S. corporations each year.
To do this, the researchers developed lists of bellwether issues on
which large groups of companies could be compared.0 For this type of
system to work, the criteria must be both relevant and measurable. As the
following figure illustrates, this can be a difficult combination to find.
Figure 1.
10
%byMgmt Care
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But given the limitations of this type of analysis, the large media compa-
nies rate very well compared with most other companies. One must con-
clude that they are motivated either by a genuine desire to improve the
situation of minorities or the desire to give the impression that they are so
motivated.
In either case, these firms should be viewed as potential capital
sources for minority media. And, given their already considerable impor-
tance in the industry, as evidenced by their many joint ventures and af-
filiations with both content providers and distributors, they ought to also
be attractive business partners.
10. See Exhibit 2.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although prospects for raising capital among institutional investors
may appear bleak, the situation is certainly not hopeless. The most prom-
ising channels appear to be minority-oriented venture funds and social in-
vestors seeking targeted investments.
Minority media should also seek capital from nontraditional sources.
Some socially motivated media organizations have chosen to solicit funds
directly. For example, a group of American Catholics is raising funds for a
Catholic radio network.1' Their approach combines traditional funding
sources with direct appeals to Catholics throughout the United States.12
Throughout this sometimes wearying process, minority media owners
should bear in mind one great virtue of participants in American capital
markets-the predictability of their behavior. They are motivated by fear
and greed, and, as has been seen, their behavior may be viewed as a ra-
tional response to the constraints under which they operate.
One positive note for managers of minority media organizations is
that this is one part of American society that is so constrained by other
factors that racism is unlikely to be a major motivator. In the current envi-
ronment, an organization that can meet the needs of institutional and social
investors, as outlined above, ought to be able to raise capital regardless of
the ethnicity of its owners.
Given the attractive economics of the media business, meeting those
requirements should not be an insurmountable challenge. As is the case for
all organizations seeking capital, strong performance will be the best pre-
dictor of success. Although the performance debate continues between ad-
vocates and critics of social investing, the ball is currently in the critics'
court. At present, there is very little evidence that investing in minority-
friendly companies hurts returns. In fact, the latest data, from Fortune
magazine, suggests the opposite:
Out of curiosity, we wondered if companies that do good also do
well by shareholders. Indeed they do. The average return to investors
for the publicly traded companies on our list [of best fifty companies
for minorities] walloped the S&P 500 over the past three- and five-
year periods: 125.4 percent to 112.2 percent and 200.8 percent to
171.2 percent, respectively. No one can say that companies striving
for-and in most cases, investing heavily in--ethnic inclusion at every
level are doing so at the expense of profits.
3
11. John Mallon, With $60 Million, Father Fessio to Launch Radio Network, INsIDE
THE VATICAN, June-July 1998, at 25.
12. Id.
13. Roy S. Johnson, The 50 Best Companies for Asians, Blacks and Hispanics,
FORTUNE, Aug. 3, 1998, at 94, 96.
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Although this should not be taken as proof that minority-friendly or
minority-owned companies necessarily outperform the market, it is quite
inconsistent with the idea that investors in those companies must bear a fi-
nancial cost for doing so.
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EXHIBIT 1
Black Enterprise Venture Fund
14
The Black Enterprise/Greenwich Street Corporate Growth Partners,
L.P., is the newly formed private equity fund that is backed by Earl G.
Graves Ltd., the leading authority on African Americans in the business
world, and Travelers Group Inc., one of the nation's leading financial
services companies with over $159 billion in assets. The venture fund has
been established to provide growth capital to existing companies with
well-defined market niches. The targeted companies will also have a suc-
cessful track record with solid financials.
14. Smith Barney (visited Mar. 15, 1999) <http://www.smithbarney.com>.
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ExHIBIT 2
KLD Social Rating Criteria for Diversity Issues
as of June 1998'5
Strengths
* CEO. The company's chief executive officer is a member of a
minority group.
o Promotion. The company has made notable progress in the pro-
motion of women and minorities, particularly to line positions
with profit-and-loss responsibilities in the corporation.
* Board of Directors. Women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold
four seats or more (with no double-counting) on the board of di-
rectors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the board is less
than twelve.
" Family Benefits. The company has outstanding employee bene-
fits or other programs addressing work/family concerns, e.g.,
child care, elder care, or flex-time.
* Women/Minority Contracting. The company does at least 15
percent of its subcontracting, or otherwise has a demonstrably
strong record on purchasing or contracting, with women and/or
minority-owned businesses.
* Employment of the Disabled. The company has implemented in-
novative hiring programs or other innovative human resource
programs for the disabled.
* Progressive Gay/Lesbian Policies. The company has imple-
mented notably progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian
employees.
Concerns
* Controversies. The company has either paid fines or civil penal-
ties as a result of affirmative action controversies, or has other-
wise been involved in major controversies related to affirmative
action issues.
" Non-Representation. The company has no women or minorities
on its board of directors or among its senior line managers.
15. KINDER, LYDENBERG, DOMINI & Co., SOCRATES USER'S GUIDE (June 1998).
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